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Professor Silva in the Hot Seat:
Defense of His Dissertation

SEPC Election Results

Hires in History

Thanks to the SEPC

Convocation Speaker:
The Japanese Textbook Question

Student Lectures and
Honors Talks
 

Ben Jenkins:
"Characteristics of Afrikaner Nationalism"

Greta Bliss:
"Dien Bien Phu and France in Indochina: A Paradigm for America's Vietnam"

Gabriel Rodriguez:
"The Immigrant Women of Lordsburg: Creating Stability in a Small, Anglo-Hispanic Town"

Julian Zebot:
"Ethno-Religious Identity in the Anglicization of the Dutch in Colonial New York"

Martha Klovstad:
"Early Dissent: Senator J. William Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings of 1966"

Katherine Kleinworth:
"The Paris Peace Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War"

Regan Golden-McNerney:
“Motherhood vs Masculinity: The Transformation of American Motherhood in Response to the Peace Movement and the Vietnam War”

Lindsay Hagy:
“Three Duchesses: The Political Influence of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, Elizabeth, Duchess of Somerset, and Melusine, Duchess of Kendal Under Queen Anne and King George I.”

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History
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History Student Lectures

Martha Klovstad: "Early Dissent: Senator J. William Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings of 1966"

Martha Klovstad traced the development of moderate dissent against US involvement in Vietnam war by tracing the political career of Senator William Fulbright. Fulbright began to challenge US foreign policy, particularly the US involvement in Vietnam, in the mid-sixties.

Fulbright had been a strong supporter of President Johnson, who had a reputation as proponent of peace. Martha noted that Fulbright had not always been an opponent of US policy in Vietnam. He had sponsored the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that increased US involvement in Vietnam and enhanced President Johnson's powers concerning it.

Soon, however, Fulbright began to see a disparity between the administration's stated and real goals. Fulbright became particularly sensitive to the ways in which Cold War fears had resulted in an unthinking foreign policy against anything that might be communist or sympathetic toward communism.

Fulbright’s concerns led him to challenge US actions in Vietnam and to urge for a foreign policy that made distinctions between different kinds of communist regimes. When Johnson simply ignored him, the senator resorted to more public forms of pressure. As chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he held televised hearings in 1966 on the US Vietnam policy.

Martha argued that the US was not yet ready for such a moderate position. The US involvement in Vietnam escalated. Unity was valued far more than debate, and Fulbright’s efforts for a more rational, truthful, and discussion of foreign policy led to accusations that he was a communist sympathizer. Nevertheless, Fulbright "opened the avenue for opposition.”

Katherine Kleinworth: "The Paris Peace Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War"

The difference between the negotiated end to the Vietnam war and the real end of that war was the subject of Kate Kleinworth’s paper. The Paris Peace Accord of 1973 ended US involvement, but it did not bring peace to Vietnam.

When the accord was signed in 1973, President Nixon promptly declared "peace in Southeast Asia.” The US promised to stop all military actions and to withdraw its troops within sixty days. In fact, Kate pointed out, the process of troop withdrawal had begun at the beginning of Nixon’s administration as part of the plan for “Vietnamization,” whereby the South Vietnam government would gradually take over the military responsibility for conducting the war.

The US also agreed to stop aid to Cambodia and Laos although, Kate pointed out, no date for ending aid was stipulated in the accord. For its part, North Vietnam promised to release US prisoners of war and hand over information on US MIAs.

The reasons why the negotiated end to the war did not bring peace were abundant, but in large measure they fell into four categories: first, the provisional government of South Vietnam was largely excluded from the final negotiations. Second, without clear deadlines and measures in place for noncompliance, much of the accord comprised little more than suggestions. Third, the failure to determine the borders between north and south before signing the accord doomed Vietnam to a bitter and bloody struggle in subsequent months. Fourth, continued US involvement in Laos and Cambodia continued to destabilize Vietnam.

The result, Kate concluded, was that the accord may have brought peace for the US, but Vietnam remained very much at war.